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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. §78-2a3(j) .

ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue

Presented:

Does

the

doctrine

of

collateral

estoppel and/or Utah's Liability Reform Act preclude multiple and
successive adjudications against different defendants on the cause
of the same damage?
Standard of Review: The issue presented for review is a
legal determination and is reviewed for correctness.

Cook v. Zions

First Ntof 1 . 919 P.2d 56, 59 (Utah Court App. 1995), cert, denied,
925 P.2d 963 (Utah 1996).

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
The provisions of Utah's Liability Reform Act, Utah Code
Ann. §78-27-37 et seq, are determinative of this appeal and they
are reproduced in Addendum 1.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Course of Proceeding
Appellant Syrett Corporation ("Syrett") implies in the

Nature of The Case portion of their Brief that only claims of
common law fraud and violations of federal and state securities
laws were asserted in a prior federal action.

However, Syrett also

asserted legal malpractice claims in that action. (R. 171-172.)
Syrett commenced the current action against Appellees
Paul H. Shaphren and Parsons & Crowther

("Shaphren") alleging

Shaphren committed legal malpractice in representing Syrett in
connection with a stock offering transaction.

The damages Syrett

claims were caused by Shaphren's conduct are the same damages
Syrett alleged and proved in a prior federal action were entirely
caused by others.(R.212-14.)
Shaphren moved for summary judgment on grounds that
collateral estoppel and Utah's Liability Reform Act preclude a
second and separate adjudication of the cause of the damages Syrett
proved in the prior federal action were caused by others.

The

District Court granted Shaphren's motion concluding collateral
estoppel barred the relitigation of the cause of Syrett's damages

2

and that Shaphren's fault could and should have been adjudicated
and apportioned in the prior federal action.

B.

(R. 523.25.)1

Statement of Facts
PRIOR ADJUDICATION
In June 1990 Syrett asserted counterclaims and a third-

party complaint against Frank B. Venuti and entities controlled by
him ("Venuti") and John R. Riley ("Riley") in a federal action
entitled Automobile Assurance Financial Corp. v. Syrett Corp./ et
al., Civil No. 90-6-2245

(the "Prior Adjudication").

The Prior Adjudication arose out of a stock offering
transaction proposed to Syrett by Venuti.

Syrett alleged Venuti

represented that the stock offering transaction would be highly
successful, risk free, that Venuti would incur all expenses related
to the stock offering and that he would receive compensation of
100,000 shares of Syrett stock only if the stock offering raised at
least

$10,000,000.

Despite

these representations, the stock

offering failed to raise any money.

Nevertheless, Venuti refused

This ruling can be affirmed based upon either or both collateral estoppel
and the recognition of a "'one action rule" under the Liability Reform Act. K&T,
Inc. v. Koroulis, 888 P.2d 623, 628 (Utah 1994) (Appellate Court "may affirm a
grant of summary judgment on any ground, even when not relied upon by the trial
court").
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to

return

100,000

shares

of

Syrett's

stock

that

had

transferred to him as compensation for the stock offering.

been

(R.133-

36) .
The relief sought by Syrett was: (a) the return of the
100,000 shares of its stock; (2) franchise taxes Syrett had paid in
connection with a reincorporation of it as a Delaware Corporation
at the urging of Venuti; and its attorney fees incurred in the
Prior Adjudication.

(R. 135) .

Syrett asserted causes of action against Venuti based
upon misrepresentation, breach of contract, fraud and breach of
federal and state securities laws. (R. 158-76).
Riley

was

its

attorney

at

the

time

of

the

Syrett alleged
stock

offering

transaction and that Riley breached professional duties owed to
Syrett as their attorney by failing to disclose conflicts of
interest, failing to protect Syrettfs

interests in the stock

offering transaction and breaching his duty to exercise undivided
loyalty and due care to protect Syrett.

(R. 158-76.)

At the conclusion of trial the court found that Venuti
had made misrepresentations in connection with the stock offering
transaction, structured an offering that was not viable and was
unmarketable, violated

federal

and

state

securities

wrongfully retained 100,000 shares of Syrettes stock.
4

laws and

(R.195-200).

The court found Riley breached duties owed to Syrett as
their

attorney

by

failing

to

explain

to

Syrett

the

legal

significance of documents he requested they sign, failing to
disclose that Venuti claimed an unconditional right to the 100,000
shares of Syrett's stock and failing to disclose conflicts of
interest which prevented him from giving competent legal advice,
(R. 191-193, 200-202.)

The court also found that Riley aided and

abetted Venuti in fraudulently obtaining the 100,000 shares of
Syrett stock in violation of federal and state securities laws.
The court stated this violation of securities laws was the basis
for holding Riley jointly and severally liable with Venuti for the
attorney

fees

and

costs

incurred

by

Syrett

in

the

Prior

Adjudication. (R.203.)
The court awarded Syrett all the relief it sought: (1)
the court ordered the return of the 100,000 shares of Syrett stock;
(2)awarded Syrett $43,000 representing Delaware franchise taxes
incurred in connection with the reincorporation of Syrett into a
Delaware corporation; and (3) awarded Syrett its attorney fees and
costs incurred in the prior adjudication.

5

(R. 202-03.)

CURRENT ACTION
In the current action Syrett alleges Shaphren breached
professional duties owed to Syrett as its attorney by failing to
disclose

conflicts

representations

of

regarding

interest,

making

the

offering

stock

negligent

false

transaction

otherwise breaching the duty of care owed to Syrett.

and

(R.3-4, 6, 9-

11.)
At the time of the stock offering Syrett knew Shaphren
had prepared a private placement memorandum in connection with the
stock

offering,

and

believed

Shaphren

was

its

attorney

represented Syrett in the stock offering transaction.

and

(R. 3-6,

138) .
Syrett acknowledges the damages it now claims were caused
by

Shaphren

are

the

same

damages

the

court

in

the

Prior

Adjudication found were caused entirely by Riley and Venuti: (1)
$43,000 in Delaware franchise taxes paid by Syrett; and (2) the
attorney

fees

and

costs

incurred

by

Syrett

in

the

Adjudication. (Syrettfs Appellate Brief, p.7; R. 212-14).
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Prior

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel bars multiple and
successive

adjudications

against

different

proximate cause of the same damage.

defendants

of

the

Accordingly, Syrettes current

action against Shaphren to recover damages previously adjudicated
to have been caused by others is barred.
Also, Utah's Liability Reform Act requires that the
adjudication and allocation of fault proximately causing damage
take

place

in

one

action

in

order

to

avoid

multiple

and

inconsistent adjudications on proximate cause and to prevent an
allocation of liability that exceeds fault.

Accordingly, the

current action which seeks a second adjudication on whose fault
proximately caused damages, the cause of which have already been
adjudicated, is barred by the Liability Reform Act.
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ARGUMENT
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND/OR UTAH'S LIABILITY REFORM ACT
BARS A SECOND ADJUDICATION OF THE CAUSE OF DAMAGES
PREVIOUSLY ADJUDICATED TO HAVE BEEN CAUSED BY OTHERS
AND THEREFORE SYRETT'S CLAIMS AGAINST SHAPHREN ARE BARRED

A.

SYRETT'S CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
The doctrine of res

judicata

provides that the final

adjudication of a claim or of a particular issue is binding on the
parties

to

that

adjudication

and

adjudication of the same claim or issue.

precludes

a

subsequent

Church v. Meadow Springs

Ranch Corp., Inc. 659 P.2d 1045, 1058(1983); Penrod v. Nu Creation
Creme, Inc., 669 P.2d 873, 875 (Utah 1983).
of res

judicata:

There are two branches

claim preclusion and collateral estoppel (also

known as issue preclusion).

While "both branches basically serve

the important judicial policy, among others, of preventing issues
once litigated from being relitigated . . ."
applications.

they have distinct

Whereas claim preclusion bars a party's claims

previously litigated, collateral estoppel prevents the relitigation
of issues that have been once litigated and determined in another
action even though the claims for relief in the two actions may be

8

different.

Penrod, 669 P.2d at 875; Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d

433, 442 (Utah 1996).
It cannot be questioned that multiple and successive
adjudications against different defendants on the proximate cause
of the same damage is exactly what collateral estoppel precludes.
The elements of collateral estoppel are:
1.

The issue in both cases is the same;

2.

The party who is precluded from litigating the issue

must be either a party to the first action or a privy of a party;
3.

The prior litigation must have resulted in a final

judgment on the merits; and
4.

The issue was fully and fairly litigated.

Id; Estate of Covington v. Josephson, 888 P.2d 675, 677 (Utah Ct.
App.1992).

1.

The Issue To Which Collateral Estoppel Applies Is The
Same In the Prior Adjudication as in the Current Action.
The issue to which collateral estoppel applies is the

proximate cause of Syrettfs damages.
the Prior Adjudication were:

The damages Syrett sought in

(1) its attorney fees and costs

incurred in the Prior Adjudication to recover 100,000 shares of its
stock, and (2) $43,000 in Delaware franchise taxes incurred in
9

connection with the reincorporation of Syrett into a Delaware
Corporation.
In the Prior Adjudication Syrett claimed these damages
were caused by Rileyfs breach of his professional duties owed to
Syrett

as

their

attorney2

and Riley

and Venuti's

violation of state and federal securities laws.

fraud

and

The trial court

agreed and entered judgment in favor of Syrett for the amount of
Delaware franchise taxes incurred by Syrett and Syrett's attorney
fees and costs incurred in the Prior Adjudication to recover its
stock.
Syrett now claims

Shaphren's breach of professional

duties owed to Syrett as its attorney caused Syrett's attorney fees
and costs incurred in the Prior Adjudication and the $43,000 in
Delaware franchise taxes.

Syrett seeks no other damages from

Shaphren. Accordingly, the issue in both cases to which collateral
estoppel applies, the cause of Syrett's damages, is the same.
Syrett claims the "issue" to which collateral estoppel
applies is not the same because different theories or claims are
asserted in the current action from those asserted in the Prior

2

The breaches alleged included failure to disclose conflicts of interest,
failure to protect Syrett's interests in the stock offering and breach of his
duty to exercise undivided loyalty and due care to protect Syrett.
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Adjudication.

However, it is immaterial whether different theories

or claims are asserted in the second adjudication.

"Collateral

estoppel, or issue preclusion, prevents the relitigation of issues
that have been once litigated and determined in another action even
though the claims for relief in the two actions may be different."
Penrod, 669 P.2d at 8753
442.

(emphasis added); Harline, 912 P.2d at

Logically, then, the barring of the relitigation of a

particular issue under collateral estoppel may have the practical
effect of barring the litigation of entire claims.

See Alaska

Foods v. Nichiro Gyocryo Kaisha, 769 P.2d 117, 123,n.6 (Ala. 1989).
Because the only damages Syrett seeks in this case are those
adjudicated

to

have

been

caused

by

others, by

barring

the

relitigation of who caused those damages, collateral estoppel has
the effect of barring Syrett's claims against Shaphren.

In its brief, Syrett incorrectly cites Penrod for the proposition that
collateral estoppel does not apply where different theories of recovery are
asserted. While Penrod discussed both collateral estoppel and claim preclusion,
the court only applied claim preclusion. The statement in Penrod relied upon by
Syrett for the proposition that different theories of recovery are relevant in
the application of res
judicata
were made in connection with the court's
application claim preclusion, not collateral estoppel. Penrod, 669 P. 2d at 87577.
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2.

The Privity Requirement is Satisfied.
It is undisputed the party against whom Shaphren invokes

collateral estoppel, Syrett, was a party in the Prior Adjudication.

3.

The Prior Adjudication Resulted in a Final Judgment on
the Merits and Was Fully and Fairly Litigated.
The Prior Adjudication resulted in a final judgment on

the merits.

The issue of the cause of Syrett's damages was also

fully and fairly litigated in the prior adjudication.
Syrett's claim that it had little knowledge or incentive
to litigate Shaphren's fault until Shaphren's testimony at trial is
not convincing.

It is undisputed Syrett knew when it commenced the

Prior Adjudication that Shaphren had prepared a private placement
memorandum in connection with the stock offering and believed
Shaphren

represented

it

in

the

stock

offering.

(Plaintiff's

Complaint, 11 8-9, 18; R. 3-6, 138). If Shaphren had refused to
talk to Syrett's counsel prior to trial as claimed by Syrett,
Syrett could have subpoenaed and deposed Shaphren if it felt it was
warranted.
avoided

The preclusive effect of collateral estoppel is not

simply because

Shaphren may have refused

Syrett's counsel before trial.

12

to talk to

4.

Other Jurisdictions Have Recognized That Collateral
Estoppel Precludes Multiple Adjudications of Proximate
Cause.
The case of Waggoner v. General Motors Corp., 771 P.2d

1195 (Wyo.1989) is a good example of the proper application of
collateral estoppel in a case similar to this. Waggoner held that
an adjudication of negligence claims arising from a two vehicle
collision which determined that a non-party driver's negligence was
the cause of the accident collaterally estopped plaintiff from
maintaining

in

a

subsequent

proceeding

warranty

and

strict

liability claims against the automobile dealer which had lent
plaintiff the vehicle.

The Waggoner court stated:

In accordance with the aforementioned cases,
we conclude that the doctrine of collateral
estoppel by judgment is an appropriate basis
upon which to affirm the district court's
grant of summary judgment on appellant's
strict liability and warranty claims.
The
jury, by its verdict in this case, clearly
determined that Elizabeth Fielder's negligent
running through a stop sign was the entire
proximate cause of the accident. Proximate
cause is as necessary under warranty and
strict liability causes of action as it is in
a negligence action. [citations omitted].
Here, the fact question of proximate cause, or
more precisely *cause in fact" was determined
against appellant in the trial of his
negligence claim.
Id. at 1204.

(emphasis added)
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Similarly,

Gossaae

v.

Roberts,

904

S.W.2d

246

(KY

Ct.App.1995) held that plaintiff was collaterally estopped by
virtue

of

his

relitigating

prior

in

a

criminal

subsequent

conviction

malpractice

for

assault

action

against

from
his

physician the issue of causation for damages caused by plaintiff's
incarceration.

Plaintiff alleged the physician's negligence in

prescribing Prozac and Xanax without proper supervision resulted in
involuntary acts which produced the violent acts resulting in his
conviction.

However, the jury in plaintiff's prior criminal case

concluded plaintiff's conduct was intentional.

The court held,

therefore, that plaintiff's incarceration was caused by plaintiff's
intentional acts and plaintiff was collaterally estopped from
relitigating

the

cause

of

his

damages,

i.e.,

from

claiming

another's negligent conduct caused his damages.
The cases addressing collateral estoppel cited by Syrett
are either distinguishable or incorrect applications of collateral
estoppel.

Monaeau v. Boutelle, 407 N.E.2d 352(MA.Ct.App.1980) is

distinguishable because the court decided the case applying claim
preclusion not collateral estoppel.4

The defendant Broker invoking

Unlike collateral estoppel, claim preclusion requires mutuality of
privity - - both the party against whom it is being invoked and the party
invoking it must have been parties or privies of parties in the prior action.
Penrod, 669 P.2d at 875.
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claim preclusion argued he was in privity with defendants in the
prior action against whom claims had been asserted.

The court

found that the Broker was not in privity with those defendants and
therefore the litigation of the claims against those defendants
would not preclude the litigation of the claims against the Broker.
Another significant distinction is that the judgment in
the prior action in Mongeau did not cover additional relief or
damages available against the Broker in the second adjudication.
In the instant case, however,

Syrett seeks the same damage, and no

others, Syrett alleged and proved in the Prior Adjudication were
caused by Riley and Venuti.
The case of Noaue v. Estate of Santiago, 540 A.2d 889
(NJ.Supr.AD 1988) is distinguishable because the court found that
a

"simple" uninsured

adjudication

with

motorist

preclusive

arbitration
effect

under

cannot
the

produce

an

doctrine

of

collateral estoppel, stating "the joint UM arbitrations were not
intended, structured or conducted to resolve, and thus cannot be
said to have fairly determined, the issue of liability between
Nogue and Santiago."

I&. at 893.

Both 0'Connor v. State, 512 NYS.2d 536(A.D.3 Dept. 1987)
and Drescher v. Hoffman Motors Corp.,585 F.Supp. 555(D Conn. 1984)
misapplied collateral estoppel by defining the "issue" in the case
15

as not whether the proximate cause of the Plaintiff's damage had
been

adjudicated

but

whether

the

"issue"

of

a

particular

defendant's cause of Plaintiff's damage had been adjudicated.
These

holdings

allow

for

multiple

and

successive

adjudications on the cause of the same damage, the number of which
would be limited only by the number of defendants against whom
claims could be brought.

Under comparative fault schemes, these

holdings would also allow for more than 100% of the fault for
particular damage to be adjudicated.
The dissenting opinion in O'Connor, joined by three
justices, recognized the majority's error in improperly defining
the

"issue" to which collateral estoppel applied:
In
applying
this
doctrine
[collateral
estoppel] to the instant case, it is crucial
to properly identify the issue necessarily
decided in the first action.
*

*

•

In the instant case, the jury at the first
trial, assessed culpable conduct of 60%
against decedent. This finding did not mean
that, as among the parties in the action (i.e.
decedent, Sulger and the cycling association
members) , decedent was 60% at fault for the
accident.
Rather, the verdict means that,
considering all causative factors, 60% of the
culpable conduct which caused the accident was
attributable to the decedent.
Id. at 541.

(emphasis added.)
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B.

UTAH'S
LIABILITY
REFORM
ACT
PRECLUDES
MULTIPLE
ADJUDICATIONS AGAINST DIFFERENT DEFENDANTS ON THE ISSUE
OF WHOSE CONDUCT OR FAULT CAUSED THE SAME DAMAGE.

1.

The Issue of Whose Conduct or Fault Caused Particular
Damage Must be Adjudicated in One Action.
Utah's Liability Reform Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-37,

et

seg., eliminated

tortfeasors and

joint

and

several

liability

among

joint

requires an apportionment of fault among all those

a plaintiff or defendant claim contributed to plaintiff's damages.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-37-41.
The Utah Supreme Court has held that a primary purpose of
the Liability Reform Act is to prevent an allocation of liability
that exceeds fault and that courts must construe the provisions of
the Liability Reform Act to achieve this purpose.

Sullivan v.

Scoular Grain Co. of Utah, 853 P.2d at 878-880.5 The adjudication
and apportionment of fault under the Liability Reform Act must take

The Sullivan Court acknowledged that a person immune from suit did not
fall within the definition of "defendant" under the Act and that, arguably the
Act precluded the consideration of any fault of the immune person in apportioning
fault among defendants. However, the court held that this otherwise reasonable
interpretation must give way to an interpretation that achieves the legislation's
primary intent of preventing an allocation of liability that exceeds a
defendant's fault.
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place in one action in order for the intent of the act to be
achieved.
The current action illustrates how multiple adjudications
against different defendants as to the cause of the same damage
frustrates the intent of the Liability Reform Act.

The claims

asserted against Shaphren are negligence claims that do not subject
him to joint and several liability for Syrettes damages.6

However,

the prior adjudication that Riley and Venuti's fault entirely
caused Syrett's damages precludes a relitigation of their fault for
purposes of determining Shaphren's proportionate share of fault, if
any, in causing Syrettes damages - - there is only 100% fault to be
apportioned.

Consequently,

this

second

adjudication

exposes

Shaphren to liability for all of Syrett's damages regardless of
whether his fault in causing these damages is actually minuscule as
compared to Riley's and Venuti's fault.
The language of the Liability Reform Act also evidences
an intent

that

fault be adjudicated

in one action. The act

The issue of whether joint and several liability among intentional
tortfeasors remains under the Liability Reform Act has not directly been
addressed by a Utah appellate court. Other jurisdictions conclude that the fault
of intentional tortfeasors must be
compared with one another where the
Jurisdiction's Comparative Fault Statutes have eliminated joint and several
liability and broadly define fault. See. E.G. Brazovick v. Andrich, 590 A.2d 222
(N.J. 1991).
However, this issue need not be resolved or addressed in the
current action since it is not alleged Shaphren committed intentional torts.
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expressly limits a defendant to one action to exercise his right to
reduce his percentage of fault by requesting that the fact finder
consider the fault of others who may have caused plaintiff's
damages.

A defendant is precluded from seeking contribution from

any other person in a subsequent action.

Utah Code Ann. §28-27-40

& 41.
Contrary

to

Syrettes

claim,

there

is

no

legal

or

equitable basis for an interpretation of the Lability Reform Act
that would allow a plaintiff to avoid the consequences of failing
to assert claims against a potentially liable party.
that

Kansas'

comparative

fault

statutes

require

In ruling
that

an

apportionment of fault take place in one action, the Kansas Supreme
Court stated:
Under the doctrine of comparative fault, all
parties to an occurrence must have their fault
determined in one action, even though some
parties cannot be formally joined or held
legally responsible.
Those not joined as
parties for determination of fault escape
liability.
Albertson v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 634 P.2d 1127, 1132
(Kans.1981).

See also Kathios v. General Motors Corp., 862 F.2d

944, 950 (1st Cir. 1988) ("concerns relating to judicial economy
also militate against allowing plaintiffs to litigate their cases
over and over against one defendant at a time.")
19

In Mick v. Mani, 766 P.2d 147 (Kans. 1988) Mick sued
Bethlehem Steel for injuries sustained in a work accident alleging
strict liability theories.

Mick sought damages for pain, loss of

wages, permanent facial disfigurement and visual disabilities.

The

jury found no fault on the part of Bethlehem Steel, nor, did it
attribute fault to anyone else. Mick had also commenced a separate
action against a plastic surgeon for negligent repair of the
injuries Mick sustained in the work accident. Mick sought recovery
for pain, loss of wages, permanent facial disfigurement and visual
disabilities.

Id. at 148.

After judgment in the action against Bethlehem Steel was
entered the trial court in the medical malpractice action dismissed
Mick's claims based on the one action rule.

In affirming, the

Kansas Supreme Court held that the comparative fault scheme forbid
plaintiff from litigating separately against separate defendants
for the same damage.

The court stated:

In the case in Rooks County [against Bethlehem
Steel], the jury had before it plaintiff's
entire claim of damage. It heard the evidence
and concluded the defendant therein was not at
fault. This was a determination of comparative
fault. True, the jury did not have Dr. Mani
in the action for comparison.
Plaintiff
elected to separate his defendants but not his
claims of damage. As a result, his entire
damage claim was presented to the Rooks County
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jury.
When that verdict became final,
plaintiff's entire damage claim was ended.
Id- at 156.
In its brief Syrett argues Mick v. Mani supports the
proposition that because the court in the Prior Adjudication did
not apportion fault between Riley and Venuti; but found them
jointly and severally liable, no comparison of fault has taken
place and the one action rule therefore does not apply.
Mick v. Mani does not stand for such a proposition.

However,

Rather, Mick

v. Mani, stated that a dismissal with prejudice after settlement or
otherwise

without

an

adjudication

of

fault

does

subsequent action seeking an adjudication of fault.

not

bar a

The jury in

the action against Bethlehem Steel did not apportion fault, it
simply found Bethlehem Steel not at fault.

The court nevertheless

found that the action against Bethlehem Steel "was a determination
of comparative fault" precluding a subsequent adjudication of
fault.
2.

Id. at 156.
Shaphren's Fault, if any, Could and Should Have Been
Apportioned in the Prior Adjudication.
Syrett contends the Liability Reform Act's "one action

rule" does not apply because Riley and Venutifs liability for

21

Syrett's

damages

was

based

Liability

Reform

Act

does

upon
not

intentional

allow

for

intentional torts with non-intentional torts.

the

torts" and
comparison

the
of

Thus, Syrett is free

to maintain this second action against Shaphren based on nonintentional torts.
If adopted, such a rule would render Shaphren jointly and
severally liable with Venuti and Riley for all of Syrettfs damages
even if Shaphren's negligence contributing to those damages was
minuscule as compared with Riley's and Venuti's fault.

Such an

outcome would entirely frustrate the intent of the Liability Reform
Act to prevent the allocation of liability that exceeds fault.
Sullivan, 853 P.2d at 878-80.
Nor, contrary to Syrett's argument, does the Liability
Reform Act expressly preclude a comparison of intention tort
conduct with non-intentional tort conduct.

The provisions of the

Act evidence an intent that such conduct be compared and, in light
of Sullivan, the Act must be so interpreted.

This claim is incorrect.
In Addition to fraud and Securities Laws
Claims, Syrett asserted legal malpractice claims against Riley nearly identical
to those against Shaphren. Syrett alleged Riley failed to disclose conflicts of
interest, failed to protect Syrett's interest and breached his duties to exercise
undivided loyalty and protect Syrett. (R. 158-76). Shaphren is alleged to have
failed to disclose conflicts of interest, made false misrepresentations regarding
the stock offering and otherwise breached the duty of care owed to Syrett and its
attorney.
(R. 3-4, 6, 9-11).
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The definition of "fault" in the Liability Reform Act in
effect at the time Syrett's claim arose reads:
M

Fault" means any actionable breach of legal
duty, act or omission proximately causing or
contributing to injury or damages . . .,
including, but not limited to, negligence in
all areas, contributory negligence, assumption
of risk,
strict
liability
and misuse,
modification or abuse of a product.
Utah

Code Ann. §78-27-37

(1992) .

This definition

of

fault

evidences an intent to include all wrongful conduct within the
definition of fault.

Syrettes claim that an intentional tort is

not an "act or omission proximately causing or contributing to
injury or damages" cannot be reconciled with any reasonable and
logical interpretation of the Liability Reform Act in light of its
primary intent to ensure that liability does not exceed fault.
Likewise, Syrettes claim that the Liability Reform Act
only requires the comparison of "fault based" claims or conduct
lacks statutory, case law or logical support.

The term "fault

based" is not defined nor does it appear in the Liability Reform
Act.

Nor, is there any case law suggesting the courts are in

agreement as to what is a "fault based" claim.

In fact, a

statement made by the Utah Supreme Court in Randall v. Allen, 8 62
P.2d 1329 (Utah 1993) indicates that, strict liability claims are
not "fault based."

The court stated "Except for intentional torts
23

and strict products liability, modern tort law does not impose
liability for personal injury absent fault or negligence . . ."
Id. at 1335.

(emphasis added.)

Since the Liability Reform Act

expressly requires the comparison of conduct giving rise to strict
liability claims, Syrett's position is directly contrary to case
law discussing what is and is not a "fault based " claim.
Additionally,

§78-27-38

requires

the fact

finder to

"[c]onsider the conduct of any person who contributed to the
alleged injury . . . "

in determining the proportion of fault of a

defendant, Utah Code Ann. §78-27-38 (1994) (emphasis added).

Thus,

conduct is to be considered not "fault based" claims.
Jurisdictions with comparative fault statutes similar to
Utah's properly recognize that to achieve the intent of comparative
fault the conduct of non-intention tortfeasors must be compared
with the fault of intentional tortfeasors.

In Natseway v. City of

Tempe, 909 P.2d 441 (Ariz.App.Div.1 1995) plaintiff sued two cities
and their police officers for their wrongful handling of a high
speed chase which resulted in plaintiff's injuries.

The plaintiffs

appealed the trial court's apportionment of fault among the cities,
their police officers and the fleeing driver, arguing that the
intentional torts of the fleeing driver cannot be compared with
those of the other defendants. Arizona's definition of "fault" in
24

its

Comparative

Fault

i ilir

defiriiti

Statute

I La\ il il

was

virtually

heiuiiui

> I

identical

to

the

Th' appellate cuuit

rejected plaintiff's arguments:
Despite Tempers duty to prevent Mendoza from
causing the harm, we believe that to place the
entire responsibility for the accident on
Tempe
would
be
inconsistent
with
the
principles of comparative fault as embodied in
the [Comparative Fault Act]. In adopting our
Comparative Fault scheme, the Legislature
intended that the trier fact consider the
fault of all persons who contributed to the
harm and intended that each tortfeasor be
"-sponsible for only his or her percentage of
_ alt and no more, [ci tati on omitted]
Id. at 443 (emphasis in original).
In Weidenfeller v. Star & Garter, 2 Ca1. Rptr.2d 14 (Ca1.
App . Dist.

1991)the

plaintiff, who was

assaulted

in a tavern

parking lot, alleged that the tavern breached its duty to protect
.'ij^^
Plaintiff's

-j:

.J an s

security.

In

rejecting

argument that intentional conduct cannot be compared

\ i :i 1 1 i i I : • n - :i n t e n t i o i I a ] c • : n d i l c t

1: h e • ::: : • i :i r t

:> b s e r ^ T e d:

According to [plaintiff] the statute has a
limited
effect
benefiting
a
negligent
tortfeasor only where there are other equally
culpable defendants, but eliminating that
benefit where the other tortfeasors act
intentionally.
Stating
the
proposition
reflects its absurdity.
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Id.

at

15-16;

See

also

Blazovick

v.

Andrich,

590

A.2d

222(N.J.1991); Martin v. U.S.,984 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir.1993); Barth
v. Coleman, 878 P.2d 319 (N.M.1994).
Finally, contrary to Syrett's claim, any difficulty in
comparing conduct deemed intentional or otherwise giving rise to
joint and several liability with negligent or non-intentional
conduct does not preclude a comparison of that conduct under the
Liability Reform Act.

Fact finders in Utah are regularly expected

to compare conduct and apportion fault based upon different kinds
of conduct with different levels of culpability.

Utah Code Ann.

§78-27-37. .See also Weidenfeller, 2 Cal. Rptr.2d at 17 where in
responding to the argument that a jury would have difficulty
comparing intentional tort conduct with negligent conduct, the
court noted that it was no more difficult than comparing strict
liability with negligent conduct.
Shaphren's conduct could and should have been compared
with Riley's and Venuti's for purposes of determining Shaphren's
proportionate fault in causing Syrett's damages, whether or not
Riley and Venuti remained jointly and severally liable based upon
intentional torts or breach of securities laws.

The District Court

properly recognized that Shaphren's fault could and should have
been adjudicated and apportioned in the Prior Adjudication.
26

Utah's

Liability Reform Act precludes
a p p o r t i o nm e n t

Df

f c i :i 1 t

any subsequent

adjudication

f • : • :i : t: 1 : = • c a i 1 s e

!

:• f

and

d a m ages

previ ous

adjudicated to have been caused by Riley and Venuti.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Shaphren respectfi 1 ] 1 ] i requests
that

this

Court

affirm

the District

Court's

grant of

Summary

Judgment in favor of Shaphren and against Syrett.

T FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
Shaphren believes oral argument will be beneficial to the
understanding and resolution of the issue on appeal and therefore
r e q u e s t s o r a J a. r g urne i i f:.
DATED this jf_

day of September, 1997.
KTPP AMD rHPT c TT»N

CARMAN E. KIPP
KIRK G. GIBBS
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78-27-37. Definitions.
As used in Sections 78-27-37 through 78-27-43:
(1) "Defendant" means any person not immune from suit who is claimed to be liable because of fault to any person seeking recovery.
(2) "Fault" means any actionable breach of le, gal duty, act, or omission proximately causing or
contributing to injury or damages sustained by a
person seeking recovery, including, but not limited to, negligence in all its degrees, contributory
negligence, assumption of risk, strict liability,
breach of express or implied warranty of a product, products liability, and misuse, modification
or abuse of a product.
(3) "Person seeking recovery" means any person seeking damages or reimbursement on its
own behalf, or on behalf of another for whom it is
authorized to act as legal representative.
1986
78-27-38. C o m p a r a t i v e negligence.
The fault of a person seeking recovery shall not
alone bar recovery by that person. He may recover
from any defendant or group of defendants whose
fault exceeds his own. However, no defendant is liable to any person seeking recovery for any amount in
excess of the proportion of fault attributable to that
defendant.
1986
78-27-39.

S e p a r a t e special verdicts on total
d a m a g e s and proportion of fault.
The trial court may, and when requested by any
party shall, direct the jury, if any, to find separate
special verdicts determining the total amount of damages sustained and the percentage or proportion of
fault attributable to each person seeking recovery
and to each defendant.
1986
78-27-40.

A m o u n t of liability limited to p r o p o r t i o n of fault — No c o n t r i b u t i o n .
Subject to Section 78-27-38, the maximum amount
for which a defendant may be liable to any person
seeking recovery is t h a t percentage or proportion of
the damages equivalent to the percentage or proportion of fault attributed to that defendant. No defendant is entitled to contribution from any other person.
1986
78-27-41. J o i n d e r of d e f e n d a n t s .
A person seeking recovery, or any defendant who is
a party to the litigation, may join as parties any defendants who may have caused or contributed to the
injury or damage for which recovery is sought, for the
purpose of having determined their respective proportions of fault.
.
1986
78-27-42.

R e l e a s e to o n e d e f e n d a n t d o e s not discharge other defendants.

AJr
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78-27-37. Definitions [Effective u n t i l J u l y 1, 1997].
As used in Sections 78-27-37 through 78-27-43:
(1) "Defendant" means a person, other than a person
immune from 3uit as defined in Subsection (3), who is
claimed to be liable because of fault to any person seeking
recovery.
(2) "Fault" means any actionable breach of legal duty,
act, or omission proximately causing or contributing to
injury or damages sustained by a person seeking recovery,
including negligence in all its degrees, contributor/ negligence, assumption of risk, strict liability, breach of
express or implied warranty of a product, products liability, and misuse, modification or abuse of a product.
(3) "Person immune from suit" means:
(a) an employer immune from suit under Title 35,
Chapter 1 or 2; and
(b) a governmental entity or governmental employee immune from suit p u r s u a n t to Title 63, Chapter 30, Governmental Immunity Act.
(4) "Person seeking recovery" mean3 any person seeking damages or reimbursement on its own behalf, or on
behalf of another for whom it 13 authorized to act as legal
representative.
1&94
D e f i n i t i o n s [Effective J u l y 1, 1997].
As used in Sections 78-27-37 through 73-27-43:
(1) "Defendant" means a person, other than a person
immune from suit as defined in Subsection (3), who is
claimed to be liable because of fault to any person seeking
recovery.
(2) "Fault" means any actionable breach of legal duty,
act, or omission proximately causing or contributing to
injury or damages sustained by a person seeking recovery,
including negligence in all its degrees, contributory negligence, assumption of risk, strict liability, breach of
express or implied warranty of a product, products liability, and misuse, modification, or abuse of a product.
(3) "Person immune from suit" means:
(a) an employer immune from suit under Title
35A, Chapter 3, Workers' Compensation Act, or Chapter 3a, Utah Occupational Disease Act; and
(b"> a governmental entity or governmental employee immune from suit p u r s u a n t to Title 63, Chapter 30, Governmental Immunity Ace.
(4) "Person seeking recovery" means any person seeking damages or reimbursement on its own behalf, or on
behalf of another for whom it is authorized to act as legal
representative.
1996
73-27-33. C o m p a r a t i v e n e g l i g e n c e .
(1) The fault of a person seeking recovery shall not alone
bar recover/ by that person.
(2) A person seeking recover/ may recover from any defendant or group of defendants whose fault, combined with the
^ault of persons immune from suit, exceeds the fault of the
person seeking recovery prior to anv reallocation of fault made
under Subsection 78-27-39(2).

78-27-41

(3) No defendant is liable to any person seeking recovery for
any amount in excess of the proportion of fault attributed to
t h a t defendant under Section 78-27-39.
('4) (a) In determining the proportionate fault attributable
to each defendant, the fact finder may, and when requested by a party shall, consider the conduct of any
person who contributed to the alleged injury regardless of
whether the person is a person immune from suit or a
defendant in the action and may allocate fault to each
person seeking recover/, to each defendant, and to any
person immune from suit who contributed to the alleged
injury.
(b) Any fault allocated to a person immune from suit is
considered only to accurately determine the fault of the
person seeking recover/ a"d a defendant and may not
subject the person immune from suit to any liability,
based on the allocation of fault, in this or any other action.
1994

78-27-39.

S e p a r a t e s p e c i a l v e r d i c t s o n total d a m a g e s
a n d p r o p o r t i o n of fault.
(1) The trial court may, and when requested by any party
shall, direct the jury, if any, to find separate special verdicts
determining the total amount of damages sustained and the
percentage or proportion of fault attributable to each person
seeking recover', to each defendant, and to any person imm u n e from suit who contributed to the alleged injury.
(2) (a) If the combined percentage or proportion of fault
attributed to all persons immune from suit is less t h a n
40%, the trial court shall reduce that percentage or
proportion of fault to zero and reallocate t h a t percentage
or proportion cf fault to the other parties in proportion to
the percentage or proportion of fault initially attributed to
each party by the fact finder. After this reallocation,
cumulative fault shall equal 100% with the persons immune from suit being allocated no fault.
(b) If the combined percentage or proportion of fault
attributed to all persons immune from suit is 40% or
more, that percentage or proportion of fault attributed to
persons immune from suit may not be reduced under
Subsection (2)(a).
(c) (i) The jury may not be advised of the effect of any
reallocation under Subsection (2).
(ii) The jury may be advised that fault attributed
to persons immune from suit may reduce the award of
the person seeking recover'.
(3) A person immune from suit may not be held liable,
based on the allocation of fault, in this or any other action.
1994

73-27-40.

Amount of l i a b i l i t y l i m i t e d to p r o p o r t i o n of
fault — No contribution.
(1) Subject to Section 78-27-38, the maxinuim amount for
which a defendant may be liable to any person seeking
recovery is that percentage or proportion of the damages
equivalent to the percentage or proportion of fault attributed
to that defendant.
(2) A defendant is not entitled to contribution from any
other person.
(3) A defendant or person seeking recovery may not bring a
civil action against any person immune from suit to recover
damages resulting from the allocation of fault under Section
73-27-38.
1394
7S-27-41. J o i n d e r of d e f e n d a n t s .
(1) A person seeking recover/, or any defendant who i3 a
party to the litigation, may join as a defendant, in accordance
with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, any person other t h a n
a person immune from suit who may have caused or contributed to the injurvr or damage for which recover/ is sought, for

78-27-42

t.
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the purpose of having determined their respective proportions
of fault.
(2) A person immune from suit may not be named as a
defendant, but fault may be allocated to a person immune
from suit solely for the purpose of accurately determining the
fault of the person seeking recovery and a defendant. A person
immune from suit is not subject to any liability, based on the
allocation of fault, in this or any other action.
(3) (a) A person immune from suit may intervene as a
party under Rule 24, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
regardless of whether or not money damages are sought.
(b) A person immune from suit who intervenes in an
action may not be held liable for any fault allocated to that
person under Section 78-27-38.
19&4

CERTIFICATE OF MAJLINJo.
On this
an _;

: r r--- - •

(-/

day of September, 1997, I deposited a true

'

i•

f ' " r ^ a< •

Shaphren and Parsons & Crowther

i Brief

in the U n i t e d

prepa

Max D. Wheeler, Esq.
Stanley J. Preston, Esq.
Richard A. Van Wagoner, Esq.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145

29

<

\opel 1 e e s

States M a i l ,

Paul

postage

H.

